# Pixel Binary Transparency

We've enabled OEMs to create their own transparency log to help their users
verify the OS or firmware running on their devices. For example, the Pixel
Binary Transparency Log is published by Google to increase trust in Pixel
factory images. We encourage users to leverage binary transparency and other
OEMs to create their own transparency log.

The rest of this page provides an overview of how Google is applying
binary transparency to Android Pixel devices.

If you want to run Pixel firmware with the highest degree of confidence, see the
verification process on
[Pixel Binary Transparency Full Verification](https://developers.google.com/android/binary_transparency/pixel_verification).

If you want to familiarize with concepts of Pixel Binary transparency using your
Pixel device, see the
[Verification Process](https://developers.google.com/android/binary_transparency/pixel_tech_details#verification_process)
on the [Pixel Binary Transparency Technical Details page](https://developers.google.com/android/binary_transparency/pixel_tech_details).

## Threat Model

Transparency systems can be used to detect---and thus deter---supply chain attacks.
Let's address some examples:

Suppose an attacker maliciously modifies a Pixel image and even manages to sign
it with the key that Google owns. Anyone who receives the malicious image can
query the binary transparency log to verify the image's authenticity. The user
will find that Google has not added the corresponding image metadata to the log
and will know not to trust the compromised image. Since publishing to the log is
a separate process from the release process with signing, this raises the bar
for the attacker beyond just compromising the key. Additionally, external,
independent parties are encouraged to monitor the integrity of the log because
it is public. These parties can attest to the append-only property of the log,
and report any tampering.

The Android Open Source Project is extensive and relies on code dependencies
like any other modern software. Unfortunately, this can serve as an attack
vector if a bad actor is able to introduce a backdoor in one of the code
dependencies. Before releasing a Pixel version and publishing to a binary
transparency log, Google performs code audits. This way, if a Pixel owner
verifies that their image is in the log, they can transitively trust that it has
passed the security and compliance audits.

Lastly, the very existence of this system and the additional discoverability of
attacks discourages malicious activity. If an image is compromised but users
only trust those that are in the log, the compromised image would need to be
publicly exposed. This increases the likelihood of discovering that the
compromised image exists, and action can be taken to remove its distribution.

## Claimant Model

The
[Claimant Model](https://github.com/google/trillian/tree/master/docs/claimantmodel)
is a framework used to define the roles and artifacts in a verifiable system. In
the case of Pixel Binary Transparency, the claim we make is that the factory
images downloaded from the Android
[factory images website](https://developers.google.com/android/images) are
official Google/Pixel factory images.

- Claim^FactoryImage^: (I, Google, claim that `$factoryImage_instance` is for `$deviceNameOrSku`), where:
  - `$factoryImage_instance` are all factory images, beginning from Pixel 6, available for download from the official Android [factory images website](https://developers.google.com/android/images).
  - `$deviceNameOrSku` can be determined by navigating to "Settings-\>About phone-\>Device name" from the user's device. The corresponding `$deviceNameOrSku` can be used to find the correct `$factoryImage_instance` from the website mentioned earlier.

## Log Content

When Google releases a new factory image for Pixel 6 or newer phones, it adds a
corresponding entry to the
[Pixel Binary Transparency Log](https://developers.google.com/android/binary_transparency/pixel_tech_details#log_implementation).

The entry contains two pieces of image metadata:

1. The [build fingerprint](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build#FINGERPRINT) of the factory image. This unique human-readable string corresponds to a particular Android implementation and revision, which allows for customizations specific to the firmware.
2. The [VBMeta digest](https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#The-VBMeta-Digest) of the factory image. This is a hash of all descriptors and metadata used in Android Verified Boot. For more information, see the [Android Verified Boot repository](https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md).

Google provides the [tools](https://developers.google.com/android/binary_transparency/pixel_tech_details#inclusion_proof)
necessary for a Pixel owner to extract the two pieces of information for a given
image. With this in hand, the user can query the log for image authenticity.

The log does not contain any personal data associated with a device, only
metadata of the factory image.

## Ecosystem Diagram

![Verifiable Log Ecosystem Diagram](https://developers.google.com/static/android/binary_transparency/images/pixelbt_ecosystem_diagram.svg "Verifiable Log Ecosystem Diagram")